Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1962

American Savings and Loan Association v. Clinton
H. Anderson et al : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Merrill K. Davis; Davis and Bayles; Attorneys for Cross-Defendants and Respondents;
F. Robert Bayle; Wallace R. Laughnor; Hurd, Bayle & Hurd; Attorneys for Cross Complainant and
Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, American Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Anderson, No. 9566 (Utah Supreme Court, 1962).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3943

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

u;·· ·.· _. ;.(~:.; ;·r UT/;.. ~-

AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff,
-vs.-

JUNl

4

1962

CLINTON H. ANDERSON, RUTH C.
McOMBER, HARRY BERMAN, JOSEPH JERRY JEREMY,, and JACQUELINE JEREMY, his wife, ROBERT J. McRAE, MRS. ROBERT J.
McRAE, his wife, CHARLES C.
CHAFFEE, JR., and MRS. CHARLES
C. CHAFFE.E, JR., his wife,
Defendants.
and
HARRCY BERMAI ~'
d A
II
ross-comp aznant an
ppe aft,
-vs.-

1.
I!

L rt:.. n'tJ:·,

~

r

l (_

.-

:;r;.

~ vV'-

1~~~~~Ll::~~R~::,
Eh~ ~if:~d ·--·---- -----·· _ . ________ ---------Cross-dl!fendants and Respondents~------~ rk. Supreme Court, Utah
Brief of Respondent
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third Judicial
District Court for Salt Lake County
Honorable Merrill C. Faux, Judge
MERRILL K. DAVIS
of
DAVIS AND BAYLES
53 East Fourth South Street
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Attorneys for_ Cross-Defendants
and Respondents
F. ROBERT BAYLE and
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR
of
HURD, BAYLE & HURD
1105 Continental Bank Bldg., SLC 1, Utah
Attorneys for Cross Complainant and Appellant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE ____________________

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ----------------------------

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ------------------------------------

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS ----------------------------------------------------

4

POINTS URGED FOR DISMISSING APPEAL AND
AFFIRMING JUDGMENT OF LOWER COURT

6

I. APPELLANT (TRANSFEREE) WAS ENTITLED TO AN UNQUALIFIED ENDORSEMENT
OF THE TRANSFEROR ONLY IF THERE W A'S NO
AGREEMENT TO THE CONTRARY; BOTH PARTIES USED A COMMON AGENT (REAL ESTATE
BROKER) AND NO WRONGDOING WAS INDICATED ON HIS PART --------------------------------------------------------

6

II. RESPONDENTS SHOULD NOT BE PENALIZED BECAUSE OF LACHES ON DR. BERMAN'S
PART IN FAILING TO NOTIFY THE JEREMYS
OF THE DEFAULT OF THE NOTE, OR OF THE
NON-PAYMENT THEREOF, NOR FOR DR. BERMAN'S FAILING TO ACQUAINT HIMSELF WITH
THE TERMS OF THE SALE OF HIS HOME TO
MR. AND MRS. JEREMY ------------------------------------------------

11

III. ASSIGNMENT OF NEGOTIABLE PAPER,
BY A SEPARATE INSTRUMENT OF ASSIGNMENT, IS LEGAL, A C C 0 R D IN G TO THE
AUTHORITIES, AND THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LA W DOES NOT PREVENT SUCH
ASSIGNMENTS ------------------------------------------------------------------------

18

CONCLUSION --------------------------------------------------------------------------

20

1

CASES CITED
Ackerman vs. Bramwell Investment Company, 80 Ut. 52,
12 p .2d 623 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13
Blair vs. Baird, 94 S.W. 116 --------------------------------------------------- 11
i

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

judgment against them on a certain promisory note
secured by two second mortgages on real property.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to -the Court. From a verdict
and judgment for the Cross~defendants and against
the Cross-complainant, no cause of action/ the Crosscomplainant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Cross-complainant seeks a reversal of the judgment/ and judgment for the Cross-complainant, or
a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The original action was brought by the plaintiff,
American Savings and Loan Association as first
mortgagee to foreclose its mortgage on real property located in Salt Lake City/ Utah. Joseph Jerry Jeremy and wife had sold this residence property to defendants Ruth C. McOmber and to her friend Clinton H. Anderson. Mrs. McOmber and Mr. Anderson
co-signed a note as part payment on this home and
delivered the same to Mr. and Mrs Jeremy, Crossdefendants. Anderson and McOmber also each
signed second mortgages to secure the note, which
was in the sum· of $4500.00/ and delivered the
mortgages to the Jeremys.
Dr. Harry Berman/ cross-complainant owned a
home in Salt Lake City which had been listed for
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sale for some time (TR. 44, 147). Dr. Berman requested a good friend of his, Sterling Webber, who was a
real estate broker to help sell the property. (TR. 146,
147, 148). The Jeremys were looking for a home to purchase having recently sold their own to Anderson
and McOmber (TR. 122). Mr. Webber's saleslady met
the Jeremys and arranged for Mrs. Jeremy to see the
residence. She did so and later returned with her
husband. They told the saleslady that if Dr. Berman would accept the $4500.00 note and the two second mortgages that they had received from Anderson and McOmber from the sale of their former
home, they would buy the Berman home (TR. 7,
123). The Bermans accepted the proposal and the
Holt-Webber Agency handled the closing of the
sale. Mr~ Webber prepared the necessary documents for the closing. Prior to the closing on October 10, 1959, Mr. Webber states that Dr. Berman
qalled him by telephone and asked if the Jeremys
were willing to guarantee this note and the second
mortgage. (TR. 155, 156). Mr. Webber states he telephoned Mr. Jeremy the same day and asked him to
guarantee the note, but was told by Mr. Jeremy that
he would not do so. (Tr. 156). Mr. Jeremy refused
to sign, endorse, or guarantee the note for $4500.00.
Mr. Jeremy told Mr. Webber that he had too many
other obligations including a proposed "side note"
with Dr. Berman ~or $3000.00 as additional balance
due and owing to Dr. Berman, and stated that if the
sale of the home hinged on his guaranteeing the
$4500.00 note, he would not be able to buy the resi-.
dence (Tr. 198). Mr. Webber testified that he then
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was quite certain that he notified Dr. Berman of Mr.
Jeremy's decision shortly after his discussion with
Mr. Jeremy, and told Dr. Berman that Mr. Webber
would have to prepare an assignment of the note
to him (Tr. 157, 158). Dr. Berman denied having ever
discussed the matter of guaranteeing the AndersonMcOmber note with anyone before or at the time
of the sale (Tr. 34, 260).
When the sale was closed on October 10, 1959,
Mr. Webber prepared a written assignment as a
separate "document wherein Mr. and Mrs. Jeremy
assigned the Anderso;n-McOmber note, agreement
and mortgage dated August 10, 1959, to Dr. Berman
and his wife. Mr. Webber, a notary public, notarized the Jeremys signatures on the assignment document. This assignment, together with the' note,
(which was not ·endorsed) and a second mortgage
from Mr. Anderson and a second mortgage from
Mrs. McOmer, and a two-page agreement prepared
by Mr. Jeremy's attorneys, Romney and Nelson (Tr.
209, 211, 213, 214), were all transferred to Dr. Berman, who acknowledged receiving the same on
October 10, 1959 ((Tr. 16, 17). Approximately 14
months later, in late November, or early December,
1960, Dr. Berman contacted the Je:remys and· arranged to come by the following night_ ;'to P,ave the
Jeremys sign the note needed for his protection because someone in Idaho had a mortgage against
his property" and Dr~ Berman had to makE? cert~n
that everything was legal, he said (Tr~ 135, 136). The
Jeremys had a pleasant visit with .D~~'_Befi!lan and
his wife, and showed- certain alteratidns ,in the form~
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er Berman home, at which time Dr. Berman presented the note to Mr. Jeremy for his endorsement (Tr.
135). Mr. Jeremy was perplexed and telephoned a
friend and lawyer, Merrill K. Davis, concerning the
giving of an endorsement on the note and was told
to sign it "without recourse." (Tr. 201). Mr. Jeremy
added the words "without recourse" and he and his
wife endorsed the note as requested. Dr. Berman
and Mrs. Berman accepted the note without any
comment and left (Tr. 14). At this time American
Savings & Loan Co., the holder of the first mortgage
on the former Jeremy home, which the Jeremys
sold to Anderson and McOmber, was suing to foreclose the first mortgage. Dr. Berman and the Jeremys
were named as defendants, because of the second
mortgages given, which the Jeremys had assigned
to Dr. Berman. Nothing was said by the Bermans
concerning the lawsuit during their visit with the
Jeremys.
Subsequently Dr. Berman, as a defendant and
Cross-complainant, sued Mr. and Mrs. Jeremy as
Cross-defendants and Respondents seeking judgment on the $4500.00 note, which Mr. and Mrs.
Jeremy had assigned to him, together with the second mortgages.
Dr. Berman and Mr. and Mrs. Jeremy all testified that at no time had Dr. Berman ever made demand upon Mr. and Mrs. Jeremy for payment of the
$4500.00 note, which monthly payments had become
delinquent by Anderson and McOmber, nor had
the Doctor ever notified them that the note was
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in -default although it became so shortly alter Dr.
Berman accepted it. The Doctor admitted that either
he, or Mr. Webber, the real estate friend, made nu~erous demands upon Mr. Anderson for payments.
It was still delinquent at the time Dr. Berman visited
the Jeremys (Tr. 201).
POINTS URGED FOR DISMISSING APPEAL AND
AFFIRMING JUDGMENT OF LOWER COURT
POINT I. APPELLANT (TRANSFEREE) WAS
ENTITLED TO THE UNQUALIFIED ENDORSEMENT
OF THE TRANSFEROR ONLY IF THERE WERE NO
AGREEMENT TO THE CONTRARY; BOTH PARTIES
USED A 'COMMON AGENT, (REAL ESTATE BROKER) AND NO WRONGDOING WAS INDICATED ON
HIS PART.

The Parr vs. Pierce Bank & Trust Co., 100 Florida 941, 130 Southern 445, mentioned on page 7 of
Appellant's Brief, from the excerpt quoted, seems
to have merit. However, the fact situation shows the
court held as it did in order to protect a widow (the
assignee) from her bank (assignor) who had authority to invest her money for her in "dependable securities." The facts were: In January, 1926 the bank
had received an $8000.00 note secured by -'.~ mortgage on real estate. It was a three year note with
interest payable semi-annually. In August, 1927, the
bank "assigned" the mortgage and note to the plaintiff, and "the money due" ... with interest from the
first day of July, 1926." (P. 943). The Court says that
"on its face at the time of this ~assignment'. the mak-
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ers of the note and mortgage were in default for
non-payment of interest due January lst 1927 and
July lst, 1927. The bank then proceeded ·to charge
the widow's account for the full sum of $8,00;00 at
a time when the makers of the note had defaulted
in two interest payments. The Court stated the bank
should, instead, have declared the full sum of the
debt due and· foreclosed the mortgage because :of
the default (P.944). The widow was obliged td fore~.
close the mortgage and was left with a substantial
deficiency. She now maintains the bank should have
given :he.r its., unqualified endorsement on the note.
As the Court .says (P~ 944).~'equity.looks upon that as
done which should have been done." The Court required the bank t6. give its unqualified ~ndot$ement
to the widow•.. The fact siluati6I1.here cle9-rly.distinguished ··it Jtont the one at issue.
In the 'Parr case .the court . quotes, .from Brannen's -NJ.L~, Page 170 and 25-9 concerning Section
49 of the ·N.I.L. (Title 44-1..;50 Utah ·.Code. Annotated
1953) which seems to relentlessly command an unqualified endorsement regardless of any agreement
for lesser endorsement, as follows:
"It certainly . does not follow that Section 49
required an unqualified endorsement in every case.
Section 49 does not specify any one kind of endorse-·
ment. In every c.ase the. transferee must go into' a·
court of equity to compel an endorsement~ Obvious!~
he will. be given the kind o·f endorsement to which
he is entitled. If the parties agreed that the traps.;.
. feror was not to assume personal liability, an' en-•
dorsement (without recourse) giv:e.~ the· tl'an$:f~tee:
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all that he is entitled to by common sense, by equity,
or by Sections 49.',

Appellant cites Fuchs vs. Leahy, 321 Mo. 47,
8 S.W. 2nd 897, on Page 9 of his brief. Part of the
quotation is omitted by Appellant but is set out fully
below with the omitted portion added and italicized. The Fuchs case, by the way, holds. squarely
against the Appellant's position. The entire quotation, which is significant, is:
"Where two or more principals employ the same
agent, whether as a means of dealing with one another, or to protect their common interests~ one cannot char.ge the other not actually at fault with the
misconduct of the common agent. The latteT owes

no more duty to one than to the other; each of the
principals is under equal duty to supervise the agent
and pro·tect his own interests, and there is no reason
why the misconduct of the agent should be imputed
to one principal rather than to the other."

This case is intended to cite the law concerning the dual agent's rights and duties but is probably not ·applicable in our case for the reason that
the Fuch's case was one in fraud and .deceit. As
stated, the court held that the plainttff in that case
was not entitled to a judgment against defendant. In
the Fuchs case the negotiations between the plaintiff and the defendant were made through a real
estate agent. The court held any misrepresentations
were made by the real estate agent and not by the
defendant. The court stated that each of the principals h~d an .equal duty to. supervise the agent and
protect· his bwn: 'interest. (P. 56). ,This the plaintiff
1
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failed to do and he cannot recover. Respondent
Jeremys urge that the Appellant, Dr. Berman, £ailed
to supervise his friend, the real estate agent, Mr.
Webber, if he, Dr. Berman were not agreeable to
the arrangements Mr. Webber accepted from the
Jeremys.
Neither of the cases cited by Appellant on Page
10 of the brief are applicable, namely the Owens
vs. Schneider case, 85 Pac. 2nd 198, and Herdon
vs. Hanson, 189 440, cases from California. Both of
those cases involved fraudulent misrepresentations
by the common agent. In the Owens case the common agent induced the plaintiff to exchange land
with the defendant and the plaintiff suHered a loss
by the agent's misrepresentations and concealments. In the Herdan case, also involving a common agent, the defendant, one of the principals,
benefitted and profited by the false and fraudulent representations of the agent, and the defendant principal was held liable in damages. However both of these were fraud actions and neither
are in point with Dr. Berman's case against the Jeremy's. Nowhere was it contended that Mr. Webber,
the common agent, had· made false, nor fraudulent
misrep:resentations,_ nor were the steps necessary to
set ui:> fraud. indicated anywhere in the record.
The courts are in conflict, however, concerning
whether the seller can recover from the buyer, even
when there are fraudulent representations by ·the
real estate broker. 'rn the case of Ringer vs. Wilkin
0919) an Idaho case, 183 Pac. 986, the court held
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the f?ell~r. is not liable to the buyer for fraudulent
representations of the broker even though the seller
gave no instructions and did not know the fraudulent representations were made. Neither principal,
the court held, could be held for the tortious acts of
the broker in the absence of collusion or participation by one of the principals in such tortious acts
(P. 986, 988, 989). Two other cases, where fraud and
deceit are not charged; hold that the plaintiff cannot recover damages. One of these is the case of
Brown vs. St. John Trust Company, a Kansas case,
1905, 80 Pac. 37. The court held the plaintiff could
not recover for damages caused in a contract with
a defendant, where there was a common agent employed and paid for by both parties, when the common agent neglected his duties and caused the
damage claimed.
In the case of Mason vs. Bernett (\N ashington)
1923, 218 Pac. 255; the buyer and seller of land had
a common agent, wherein the seller paid a commission. The agent was consulted by the buyer on matters collateral to the sale of the land. The buyer
thereafter claimed that she was advised that she
~~~l<;i forfeit the payments made by her and terminate the contract at any time. However, the court
stated that she could read and write/ was a woman
of .~~me means, and with business experietice. If
she failed to read the note and mortgage involved
herein, it was her own fault. The court stated the
real estate broker was her agent concerning the
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legal effect of the collateral inqu1nes which she
made, and the seller was not liable for any representations which the common agent made.
In a 1906 Texas case, Blair vs. Baird, 94 S.W.
116, the court likewise held that in a contract between a buyer and a seller of cattle, where both
parties hired a joint agent to count the cattle, the
seller was not liable for the misconduct of the joint
agent, unless it was shown that the two conspired
together to defraud the buyer of said cattle.
Nowhere in the record in Dr. Berman's action
against Mr. and Mrs. Jeremy, is it charged, implied,
or made out that there was any conspiracy, any
fraudulent misrepresentations nor the elements of
deceit charged to the real estate broker, Mr. Webber. Certainly none is charged to Mr. and Mrs. Jeremy. The Jeremys were total strangers to Mr. Webber prior to this sale; Dr. Berman and Mr. Webber,
on the other hand, were friends and social acquaintances.
POINT II. RESPONDENT SHOULD NOT BE
PENALIZED BECAUSE OF LACHES ON DR. BERMAN'S PART IN FAILING TO NOTIFY HIM OF THE
DEFAULT OF THE NOTE OR OF THE NONPAYMENT THEREOF, NOR FOR DR. BERMAN'S
FAILING TO ACQUAINT HIMSELF WITH THE
TERMS OF THE SALE OF HIS HOME TO MR. AND
MRS. JEREMY.

Dr. Berman testified that, although he had examined the documents received from the Jeremys
before the closing, he did not ask Mr. Webber, the
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real estate broker about the contract (Tr. 31), that he
did not understand the payment arrangement for
the same to be in mutual fund certificates over a ten
year period, that he didn't examine the documents
involved, but "assumed that everything was all
right," (Tr. 31, 32, 33). Dr. Berman never noticed that
the $4500.00 note was not endorsed, nor that one of
the mortgages had been recorded and the other one
not recorded when he examined them and accepted
them (Tr. 34, 35). The Doctor further stated that he
relied on the real estate broker who was a friend,
socially and also· a close acquaintance, although he
admits he never told Mr. Webber what he wanted
(Tr. 45, 46). Once, when Dr. Berman questioned the
value of the note to Mr. I eremy he was told that it
was "good as gold" and that apparently satisfied
him and he inquired no further, although a week or
more of negotiations were in effect before the Ieremys purchased the home from Dr. Berman {Tr. 9,11).
The Pritchard vs. Strike case (66 Utah, 243 Pac.
114), a 1926 Utah decision, was quoted by appellant
on Page 6 of his brie~. The fact situation clearly distinguishes that case from the Berman-Jeremy controversy in the following particulars: In the Pritchard case the "endorsement" was on the n<;>te itself
and used words of assignment to "assign, set over
and deliver" the note and mortgage. This was a
proper holding in view of the negotiable instruments law, according to Briton on Bills & Notes.
He says: "If a holder of a negotiable instrument
writes on the back thereof:"! hereby assign the within instrument to 'A' " or uses words of like import
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and signs his name thereto and delivers the instrument to 'A', such a transfer constitutes a negotiation
of the instrument by endorsement and delivery/ and
is not mere assignment of the holder's rights." In
the endorsement of a negotiable instrument on its
back, the additional words such as 1/without recourse" or words of similar import are also required
in order to make out a qualified endorsement. Britton on Bills and Notes, Page 230. Too/ in the Pritchard case the ''endorser" was the president o~ the
company that made the note. As such he had full
knowledge of the presentment, demand and nonpayment of it. In the most positive language he was
told that the plaintiff (transferee) would look to him
for the payment of it. This distinguishes the case
from the Berman vs. Jeremy case.
_ _Dr. Berman cites the Ackerman vs. Bramwell
case, another Utah case, on Page 6 of his Brief, to
support his claim that he is entitled to the Jeremy's
unqualified endorsement. This case, however (80
Ut. 53, 12 Pac. 2nd 623) is a "fraud" case; the plaintiff (transferee) won in the District Court. On appeal
the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial.
In this Ackerman case/ concerning the written assignment of a promissory note, the lo-wer court
found that the transferror has unequivocally agreed
to endorse the note for the plaintiff when she purchased it, and also "guaranteed its payment" to the
plaintiff holder, and it was actually the "intention of
the parties that the company was to endo-rse the no-te
but had not done so." (P. 60) (emphasis added). In
the Ackerman case the assignment was represented
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to the plaintiff by the defendant as being an "en~

dorsement and guaranty," but actually was not. In
such a situation the holder was, of course, entitled
to the endorsement of the transferor.
One of the leading Utah cases on assignment
matters is Johnson vs. Beiky (64 Ut. 228 Pac. 189). In
tqat case the assignment was made by the defendant
in good faith and for a valuable consideration and
prior to the service of the Writ of Execution on. a
bank who held the note as security. Johnson (the
plaintiff and tranferee) relied upon N.I.L. (Sections
44-l-31, 32 and 33, UCA 1953), asserting_that,· inte-r'
alia, since the note was not actually delivered a,t the
time of an assignment that he was entitled to a prior~
ity over the creditor. The ~upreme Court held 9th(3~~
wise, and stated:
"Like an ordinary chose in action, a biu·-~r note· may
be trans-ferred by assignment or by mere-- delivery
with the usual incidence of such a transfer_, and this
rule is not changed by the negotiable instruments
law. It may be formal or informal; it may be by
separate instrument, or in the absence of a statute
to the contrary, by parol." Continuing, the court said,
"No doubt a promissory no-te may be transferred
without endorsement, the same as any other article
of personal property, either under our statute, or
independant of statute."
The Court then added the followin_g significant
statement, "Assignment" and "endorsement" as applied to ne-gotiable instruments are not syno-nomous
terms. An endorsement is not me-rely a transfer o-f
title, but a new and substantive contract by which
the endorser becomes a party to the instrument and
liable, on certain conditions, for its payment. An
assignment means a transfer of the title. It neither
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includes nor implies becoming: in a~y ··way a party
to the payment, or responsible for the-insolvency or
default of the maker.

The Thatcher vs. Merriam, cas~ (121.lJtah 19 L
240 Pac. 2d, 266) also recognized -that an. a§~!~nment
o£ a promissory note together 'Witb··:ade~:d ·6£ trust
and chattel mortgage given in:·security was upheld
as an assignment in this state.
In the case of Lawrence vs.: Cltfzen'~ State B~k,
113 Kan. 724, 216 Pac. 262, also cited b}/Dr. Berman on page 7 of his Brief, the f~ct s~t4atiof11s ·clearly
distinguished from the Berman-Ieremy contrbversy.
In the Lawrence case no writte~.as~ignment was involved, nor was there a clairr(<Sf ·one; the ISlaintiff
was merely seeking the endot$km§nt''ort the note
from the tranferor. The plainHH.hacl. acquJr~dfrotn
the defendant, in due course,' i cg'ttairt notes '\,.;h.ich
had. not been endorsed and pld'intiff sued·· for sl.Ich
endorsement. The court held 'that· :the' plaintiff ··was
entitled to the endorsment, "uh.t~ss'a'}n.1a]ifie4·
dorsement was agreed to by th~~·par-Ues,"'ot~is- fairly
to be implied from the circums:tances. involv.~d in
the transfer.''
.
. -·

en-

7

-

ij=-~-

,-. '

..

Appellant also stated, as b.eipg irr-qcoor<:i ,with
the Lca:wrence case the QueensbcmO'·~Na:tional· ·Bank
of the City of New York vs. Kelly, 48 ·Fed. 2d. 574.
The Oueensboro case was a 1931 decision wherein
the bank as payee sued Kelly as rnaker;·to~recover
the principal and interest on a promissory note. The
complaint was dismissed and the plai-:mtiff, appeared,
and the case was -reversed and remanded fo:e.. a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
new triaL Although some mention of "assignments''
and "endorsements" is made in the· court's opinion,
there is nothing helpful in this case to benefit either
Dr. B~rman or the Jeremys' in the issues involved
here. In. the Oueensboro case the "assignment" was
written on the marg1n of the note itself by the maker.
Likew.ise cited, by the Appellant on page 7 of
the Brief was Miller vs. Shelby County Investment
Cqmpany, 30 S.W. 2d, 688. This was a 1930 Texas
case and there was no "assignment paper" involved
in that suit... The promissory note was transferred
from the defendo,IJ.t to the plaintiff. The issue was
whether the trq.nsferee was entitled to an endorsement because of defendant's "prior agreement" to
give such endorsement. The court said, "Whether
the tran,sferor of . . tbe note agreed, at the time of the
transfer, to endo~e the note, was held to be a question of fact; an agreement to transfer the note is
prima ~acie an agreement to transfer it in the usual
way by endorsement; if a transferor delivers an instrument without. an endorsement, upon good consideration, It being agreed that he would endorse,
and. he later refuses, equity may compel his endorsement. Further, where the note is transferred
for value, with the understanding that the transferor
is not' to endorse, .or that the endorsement is only
for the purpose of conveying title, the transferor
cannot be held as an endorser. When a note, for
valuable consideration is transferred without endorsement there being no agreement regarding endorsement, the transferee may compel an endorsement in equity.'' {Emphasis added) The court held
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that the transferor of the note had "promised to endorse it," and therefore required his endorsement.
Another Texas case, Prewitt vs. Uoyd, 240 S.W. 1039,
on a similar fact situation to the Miller case, held exactly opposite. There the jury found there was no
promise by the defendant to endorse the note which
had been transferred to the plaintiff. In neither of .
the Texas cases was there a question of an instrument of assignment involved, nor was there any
claim of being a completed written assignment as
existed between Dr. Berman and the Jeremys.
Both Dr. Berman and the Jererhys testified· that
Dr. Berman never made demand for- payment upon
the Jeremys at any time, including up to the time of
trial. Dr Berman waited approximately 14 months
before he sought the endorsement of the Jeremys
and never made timely demand upon them for payment of the note which had been defaulted by Mr.
Anderson.
In connection with Dr. Berman's failure iri this
regard, or to even notify them that the note was in
default, the Jeremys refer _to· the.·case. of Willard
State Bank vs. Clarke; zoe· l?ac~_ 549, ·_a·: l<a;nsas case
decided in 1922. Here the transferee received the
note without the endorsement of the·transferor. The
maker defaulted in its payments.. Two months arid
11 days after ·the default, transferee of the note no~
tified the transferor concerning ·the . default .and
claimed it is now- entitled ·to ·-trahsferor~~s endorsement. The court held against thEi transferee::oh the
grounds· thaf'the note cmust be presented:.:on the due
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date to the_ maker/ .and if dishonored, the endorser
rr{ust be_ prorpJ?~~y ;~~tified, either personally or by
maiL Sections 44-1;.91 to 99 inclusive, Utah Code
Annotated, 'f94~{ spe1l out this duty on the part of the
transferee.·.. ·
POINT IlL . --~s-~IGNMENT OF NEGOTIABLE
PAPER, BY A 'SEPARATE INSTRUMENT OF ASSIGNMENT, IS LEGAL;Ae'CORDING TO THE AUTHORITIES, AND THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT LAW
DOES NOT PRE:V~N~T S:UCI;I_ ~SSIGNMENTS.

·-'· Ir:t1 AmeJ1cai1 Jyrisprude:qce, Section 75, page
2S7i. it f:;tatesJhat. tl;l~ only form required for an
assignment is t~atit··must comply with the fundamen·
tal· requisites: applicable to the contracts as respects
u1egality of' bbject, capacity of parties,. consideration
and.·consent.n No-special form of words is necessary
tc}: ~ff.ecf an ·As~igrl.fuent. The ·only-·thing required
is language showing an intention of the owner of
the· chose:Jn· action.·1o "transfer" it. This 'is sufficient
to vest the prepettY,dn the assignee. Accord, 64 S.E.
264,. (Georgia); 54·-,N.W. 867, Uowa); 154 Pac. 210
(Kansas); :224 N.W~· 720 (Wisconsin.).
·,:

. In Appellant'.s 13rief, Page 5, he quotes Title 4411-50, Utah Gode::Annoted, 1953, concerning the transferee's right to have;the endorsement of the transferor. However;~:in ·:applying this statute in the case
of :Thatche.t:j vs; ·;Merriam, 121 Ut. 191, 240 Pac. 2d,
266, :the;Cotirt,held-·,that a bill or note may be transfertedd:>y.·aSsignment or by mere delivery with the
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usual incidence of such a transfer; and this rule
is not changed by the Negotiable Instrument Law
(Title 44, Utah Code Annotated 1953). Further, the
assignment may be made by a separate instrument,
and such an assignment was recognized and upheld.
On pages 8 and 9, the Appellant, in his Brief, '
argues that since there was "no language of limitation in the assignment of the note at the time of its
transfer to Appellant Berman" that appellant is now
entitled to an unqualified endorsement. Assignments
ordinarily carry no "language of limitation" such as
the words "without recourse" and words of other import. These qualifying endorsements are used in
negotiable instruments and do not ordinarily appear on assignments. In this regard, both a qualified
endorsement, such as would appear on a note, and
an assignment instrument make certain warranties in
that both represent that the document is genuine,
that one has good title to it, that the prior parties had
capacity to contract, and that one has no knowledge
of any fact which would impair the validity o~ the
instrument or render it valueless. Therefore, to add
the further restrictive words, "without recourse," on
an assignment instrument would seem to be both
surplusage and redundant. In 8 Am. Jur. Section
301, Pages 38 and 39, the rule of law is stated that
a bill or note, whether negotiable or non-negotiable,
may be· transferred by assignment. The negotiable
instruments law does not prevent the transfer of a
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negotiable instrument by assignment. In further support of this proposition are the following cases: Capitol Hill State Bank vs. Rawlins National Bank (Wyo.),
160 Pac. 1171; Carter vs. Butler (Mo.) 174 S.W. 399;
Edgar vs. Haines (Ohio), 141 N.E. 837; and Moore
vs. Miller, 6 Ore. 254.
CONCLUSION
· We respectfully submit that the Court was correct in giving judgment for the Jeremys and against
Dr. Berman on the $4500.00 note and that the note
had been legally transferred by the document of assignment.
We believe the court did not err in its conclusions and decision herein in light of all the testimony
and evidence presented at the trial, including the
memoranda of authorities submitted. The assignorassignee relationship claimed by the Jeremys and
disputed by Dr. Berman is a question of fact for the
court. In this particular fact situation, most authorities researched uphold this type of assignment as being a valid one. The Anderson note was transferred
to Dr. Berman by ·the Jeremys by separate instrument of assignment for the reasons heretofore stated;
it was received by Dr. Berman, by his own testimony,
as part payment and credit on the purchase of the
house. He should not now be allowed to ignore that
credit and require the Jeremys to honor the Anderson note, by contending that the Jeremys were un-
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qualified endorsers of such note in view of the many
other facts presented during the trial of the case.
Respectfully submitted,
MERRILL K. DAVIS
Of DAVIS and BAYLES
Attorneys for Cross-Defendants
and Respondents
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